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I. INTRODUCTION 
The government seeks to prosecute the former publishers of an online classified 
advertising service, Backpage.com, under a novel theory of vicarious liability never 
embraced by any federal court.  The government is seeking to punish the providers of 
the platform because of the content of ads posted by its users, and is a claiming it may 
accomplish this objective without any consideration of the First Amendment 
implications of its actions.  Beginning with the premise that it can close down the 
website and criminally prosecute all who were involved with it, the government has 
attempted to build a case based on broad generalizations and invective that starts with 
the improper assumption the First Amendment does not apply and fails to allege any 
criminal acts by the Defendants.1
This case is the culmination of a decade’s worth of efforts by law enforcement 
officials and policymakers at various levels of government to prohibit adult-oriented 
online advertising.  It began with actions by state attorneys general and other officials 
to intimidate the website Craigslist, which succumbed to the pressure and closed its 
erotic services section in 2010.  The campaign immediately turned to Backpage.com, 
then the second-largest classified ad website, with similar demands to shutter 
categories for adult content.  Backpage.com, however, challenged the government’s 
unconstitutional claims that equate advertising for escorts and other adult services with 
prostitution, and won a series of court victories affirming that providing such a 
platform for third-party speech is protected by the First Amendment.  Federal courts 
struck down state legislation that sought to prohibit such advertising, enjoined 
governmental use of nuisance suits and veiled threats to close down adult ad sections, 
and dismissed state prosecutions based on the same vicarious liability theory upon 
which this federal case is based. 
1 Movants Michael Lacey, James Larkin, John Brunst, and Scott Spear are referred to 
here as “Defendants.” 
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These decisions only led authorities to escalate their efforts to “crush 
Backpage.”  Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 230 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 46 (2016).  Here, federal prosecutors are proceeding under the same 
flawed vicarious liability theory that California courts rejected twice in dismissing 
criminal charges against two of the Defendants.  The 100-count Indictment2 starts from 
the erroneous assumption that all ads on the platform are constitutionally unprotected, 
that government may presume the ads relate to unlawful conduct simply by looking at 
them and by parroting accusations often repeated (and rejected) in previous cases, and 
that the government can prosecute based on a theory of generalized awareness that 
does not depend on specific knowledge or intent.  The government’s conduct of this 
case reflects an alarming disregard for the rule of law and constitutional norms.  It 
seized Defendants’ assets presumptively protected by the First Amendment without a 
hearing, has sought to deprive the Defendants of assistance of counsel, has distorted 
the record and refused to disclose exculpatory information, and has resisted efforts to 
subject its overreaching to judicial oversight. 
The Indictment must be dismissed because it fails to set forth facts constituting 
the offenses charged, as required by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  Additionally, 
because this prosecution targets publishing activities, the government must more 
specifically identify the precise conduct alleged to fall outside the First Amendment’s 
protection.  Rather than allege specific requisite facts to meet this obligation, the 
Indictment is a tapestry of generalized claims, recycled accusations, and miscellaneous 
assertions regarding activities that are constitutionally protected.  The Indictment 
charges Defendants with crimes that require a showing of specific intent (even in cases 
not implicating the First Amendment), yet utterly fails to allege mens rea.  The 
absence of this essential element is especially remarkable because the government 
previously has acknowledged the specific intent requirements applicable to publishers 
2 The operative pleading in this case is the superseding indictment (Doc. 230), which, 
for simplicity, is referred to in this motion as the “Indictment” and is cited as “SI.”   
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of third-party content in numerous other settings – including in other pending litigation 
where it currently is touting those requirements as the controlling standard for Travel 
Act prosecutions implicating the First Amendment.  These defects in the Indictment 
are fatal; it must be dismissed. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Backpage.com. 
Defendants are former owners of a newspaper conglomerate that, at one time, 
published and distributed 17 weekly papers across the country, including the Phoenix 
New Times, the SF Weekly, and New York’s Village Voice.  Lacey and Larkin founded 
and built the Phoenix New Times, SI ¶ 18, which began publication in 1970 to “ke[ep] 
the Valley of the Sun’s feet to fire” through independent investigative journalism, see 
Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (upholding Civil 
Rights Act complaint against Sheriff Joe Arpaio and special prosecutor for pursuing 
and arresting Larkin and Lacey in retaliation for publishing critical articles).  The 
newspapers featured articles on political and cultural issues not typically covered by 
mainstream media sources and received numerous awards for excellence in journalism, 
including the Pulitzer Prize.3
Lacey and Larkin are the majority owners of the corporate parent of Village 
Voice Media Holdings, LLC (“VVMH”),4 and Brunst and Spear hold minority 
interests in the company.  Lacey served as Chief Editor of the VVMH papers, Larkin 
was CEO of VVMH, Scott Spear was an Executive Vice President, and John Brunst 
was the CFO.  SI ¶ 18.  
Like other alternative weeklies, the VVMH papers were free to readers, so they 
depended on advertising revenues, including from classified ads.  By the early 2000s, 
the Internet – and particularly Craigslist – was undermining the economic viability of 
3 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Village_Voice_Media#Philosophy_of_journalism. 
4 The company is now known as Camarillo Holdings, LLC, but is referred to here (as it 
is in the Indictment) as “VVMH” for clarity.  
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newspaper classified advertising.  SI ¶ 20.  In response, in 2004 VVMH launched a 
website (“Backpage.com”) to publish third-party classified ads online.  Id. ¶ 21.  
Categories of advertisements on the site spanned the full spectrum – including for 
auto sales, real estate, apartment rentals, and jobs, as well as adult categories 
including dating, massage, and escort services – as had been published in newspapers, 
yellow pages and other media for decades.  See Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 
F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1282 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (noting “numerous states license, tax and 
otherwise regulate escort services as legitimate businesses”).  Over time, 
Backpage.com grew to become the second largest online classified advertising 
website in the United States (after Craigslist), with users posting millions of ads each 
month.  See id. at 1266.   
In 2013, VVMH sold its interests in the newspapers to a group of long-time 
executives from the papers.  In April 2015, VVMH sold its interests in Backpage.com 
to entities owned by Carl Ferrer (Backpage.com’s CEO).  SI ¶ 29-30.  Both of these 
transactions were seller-financed.  VVMH ceded ownership and control of the papers 
and the website, respectively, to the new owners, and in return VVMH received (and 
holds) installment promissory notes for the purchase prices of the sales, secured by 
security interests in the businesses and assets sold.  See SI ¶ 30-31. 
B. Court Decisions Rejecting Government and Other Challenges to 
Adult-Oriented Advertising on Craigslist and Backpage.com. 
As Internet advertising grew, various government authorities and interest 
groups attacked adult-oriented advertising, first targeting Craiglist.org (“Craigslist”) 
and then Backpage.com.  Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart brought a nuisance suit 
against Craigslist, alleging that all adult services ads on the site were for prostitution 
or sex trafficking and that Craigslist violated federal and state laws prohibiting the 
facilitation of prostitution, including the Travel Act.  Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. 
Supp. 2d 961, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2009).  The U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois rejected the sheriff’s claims under Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“CDA”), but also because websites are intermediaries 
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like phone companies and ISPs, which “are not culpable for ‘aiding and abetting’ their 
customers who misuse their services to commit unlawful acts.”  Id. at 967.   
Nonetheless, a group of state attorneys general continued to pressure Craigslist 
to eliminate its adult services category, and in September 2010 Craigslist relented, 
removing the category from the website and declaring that it had been “censored.”5
Less than a week later, the AGs targeted Backpage.com, demanding that it too shut 
down its adult category.6  Backpage.com attempted to work with the attorneys general 
– explaining its review and moderation of user content and cooperation with law 
enforcement – but the AGs continued to make publicized demands that the website 
eliminate all adult services ads, as Craigslist had done.7  Backpage.com was unwilling 
to succumb to censorship, and its position was upheld repeatedly in a number of 
lawsuits. 
In 2012, the Washington State legislature enacted a statute targeting 
Backpage.com and creating a new state-law felony for disseminating content online if 
it contained a “depiction of a minor” and any “explicit or implicit offer” of sex for 
“something of value.”  McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1268.  The U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Washington enjoined enforcement of the statute, rejecting 
the state’s arguments that the law affected only unprotected speech proposing illegal 
transactions based on the assumption that all adult ads on Backpage.com were for 
prostitution or trafficking.  Id. at 1282.  The court struck down the law under the First 
Amendment because it would have “chill[ed] a substantial amount of protected 
speech.”  Id. at 1282. 
5 Claire Miller, “Craigslist Says It Has Shut Its Section for Sex Ads,” N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 15, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/business/16craigslist.html.
6 See Connecticut Attorney General press release (Sept. 21, 2010), 
https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/AG/Other/Backpageletterpdf.pdf?la=en. 
7 See Letter of National Ass’n of Attorneys General (Aug. 31, 2011), https://agportal-
s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/Home/News/Press_Releases/2011/NAAG_
Backpage_Signon_08-31-11_Final.pdf. 
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Tennessee passed a similar law shortly after Washington, but the U.S. District 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee enjoined enforcement of that statute as 
well, likewise holding that third-party ads on Backpage.com were protected speech 
under the First Amendment.  Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 
833-34 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (rejecting state’s argument that the statute “[did] not 
implicate First Amendment scrutiny because it criminalize[d] only offers to engage in 
illegal transactions”).  Despite invalidation of the Washington and Tennessee laws, 
the New Jersey legislature enacted a similar statute, which the U.S. District Court for 
the District of New Jersey struck down, again rejecting arguments that adult-oriented 
ads on the website were unprotected speech.  Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, 2013 
WL 4502097, at *9-11 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013). 
At the same time, the DOJ also pursued a grand jury investigation of 
Backpage.com in the Western District of Washington, but the U.S. District Court 
there quashed a number of grand jury subpoenas premised on the government’s novel 
theory of vicarious liability.8
After Washington, Tennessee, and New Jersey failed in their efforts to censor 
Backpage.com, Sheriff Dart came up with a new tack, threatening Visa and 
MasterCard to cut off use of their cards on the website.9  The Seventh Circuit directed 
entry of an injunction against the sheriff, holding that he imposed an unconstitutional 
informal prior restraint.  Backpage.com v. Dart, 807 F.3d at 231 (citing Bantam 
8 The court’s orders in that case, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas to Backpage.com, LLC 
and Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, No. GJ12-172RAJ (W.D. Wash.), are 
provided in an accompanying submission under seal.   
9 The Indictment alleges that the “credit card companies stopped processing payments 
for Backpage … out of concern they were being used for illegal purposes,” SI ¶ 15, but 
fails to mention the Seventh Circuit found that Visa and MasterCard blocked use of 
their cards “within days of receiving the [Sheriff Dart’s] letter,” and “were victims of 
government coercion aimed at shutting up or shutting down Backpage’s adult section 
[or] more likely aimed at bankrupting Backpage ….”  Backpage.com v. Dart, 807 F.3d 
at 233. 
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Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64-72 (1963)).  Again in that case, the court 
rejected the contention that all ads in the adult section of Backpage.com were 
unlawful and held, to the contrary, that First Amendment protections applied.  Id. at 
234 (“Nor is Sheriff Dart on solid ground in suggesting that everything in the adult 
section of Backpage’s website is criminal, violent, or exploitive.... [N]ot all 
advertisements for sex are advertisements for illegal sex.”) (emphasis in original).  As 
Judge Posner wrote, “a public official who tries to shut down an avenue of expression 
of ideas and opinions through actual or threatened imposition of government power or 
sanction is violating the First Amendment.”  Id. at 230 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Private plaintiffs also sued Backpage.com for tort claims premised on the 
website’s alleged violation of federal criminal law, asserting that all adult ads on the 
website were for prostitution or sex trafficking and that the site’s design and practices 
were meant to promote such unlawful activity.  Courts summarily rejected these 
claims too.  In M.A. ex rel. P.K v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 
2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
dismissed the plaintiff’s claims (based on alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1595, 
and 2255) asserting that Backpage.com’s posting rules and editorial practices were 
designed to veil illegal ads, that Backpage.com was “made aware of minors being 
trafficked on their website,” and that it therefore “facilitated” trafficking.  809 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1044-45, 1050 (plaintiff alleged “no reasonable person could review the 
postings in the adult categories and deny prostitution was the object of almost each 
and every ad”).  Even under liberal civil pleading standards, the court held that the 
plaintiff’s allegations failed to “describe the specific intent required for aiding and 
abetting,” i.e., that a defendant acted with the intent to bring about “a certain crime” 
and “participated in an unlawful venture … to bring it about.”  809 F. Supp. 2d at 
1054 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).   
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In Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 104 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D. Mass. 
2015), aff’d sub. nom., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017), the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts reached a similar result in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims brought under 
18 U.S.C. § 1595 attacking Backpage.com’s practices (including as to review and 
editing of ads), stating:  “Singly or in the aggregate, the allegedly sordid practices of 
Backpage … amount to neither affirmative participation in an illegal venture nor 
active web content creation.”  104 F. Supp. 3d at 157.   
And, most recently, the California Attorney General’s Office – which has been 
working in concert with the DOJ for many years to pursue Backpage.com for many 
years – twice brought criminal charges against Defendants Larkin and Lacey (and 
Ferrer) for promoting and receiving proceeds from prostitution, but two different state 
judges dismissed the charges on demurrer.  People v. Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2016); People v. Ferrer, No. 16FE024013 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 
2017).10  These courts rejected the same presumptions (e.g., that all ads on 
Backpage.com were for prostitution) and the same vicarious liability theory that other 
courts rejected before, and held that the defendants could not be prosecuted for 
facilitating or promoting prostitution or for money laundering based on users’ 
payments for ads.  As the courts held, “[p]roviding a forum for online publishing is a 
recognized legal purpose” and “charg[ing] money for the placement of advertisements 
… qualif[ies] as services rendered for legal purposes.”  2016 WL 7237305, at *10; see 
also id. at *3 (court’s rulings enforcing Section 230 implicate and enforce First 
Amendment rights). 
C. Criminal Prosecution in Arizona and Asset Seizures in the Central 
District of California. 
10 The second of these opinions is unpublished, and so is provided with the 
attachments to this motion as Exhibit A.   
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Undeterred by the numerous rulings discussed above, the government 
commenced a prosecution against Defendants and three other individuals for their 
respective roles with Backpage.com.11  On March 28, 2018, the government obtained 
a 93-count grand jury indictment charging these defendants with violations of the 
Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952), money laundering (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957), and 
conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371), all based on the defendants’ prior involvement, in 
general, with Backpage.com (Doc. 3).   
At the same time, the government negotiated and entered into a plea agreement 
with Backpage.com’s owner and CEO, Carl Ferrer.  On April 5, 2018, Ferrer pled 
guilty to one count of conspiracy to launder money and violate the Travel Act, see
United States v. Ferrer, No. CR-18-464-PHX-DJH (Doc. 7), and caused 
Backpage.com and his other corporate entities to plead guilty to one count of money 
laundering, see United States v. Backpage.com, LLC, et al., No. CR-18-465-PHX-
DJH (Doc. 8).  Ferrer agreed to cooperate with the government in its prosecution of 
Defendants. 
On April 6, 2018, the government seized and shut down the Backpage.com 
website, see http://www.backpage.com (government’s notice of seizure).  Also on that 
day, the government arrested Defendants and searched Lacey’s and Larkin’s homes, 
seizing computers, jewelry, artwork and other assets (using warrants authorizing the 
seizure of, among other things, any “evidence of wealth”).  On a parallel track, in the 
Central District of California, the government obtained ex parte warrants to seize 
bank accounts and personal assets of Defendants and their families.  Through multiple 
waves of such warrants (issued from March 28 through November 2018), the 
government has seized many millions of dollars from Defendants and has encumbered 
11 The other individuals named as defendants in the Indictment are Andrew Padilla 
(Backpage.com’s former operations manager), Joye Vaught (its former assistant 
operations manager), and Dan Hyer (its former sales and marketing manager).  SI ¶¶ 5-
7.  Hyer has since entered into a plea agreement with the government (Doc. 271). 
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their real property through lis pendens filings.  The government’s theory for its vast 
seizures is that any and all revenues of Backpage.com (and any assets directly or 
indirectly connected to those revenues) constitute criminal proceeds.   
On July 25, 2018, the government filed a superseding indictment, which added 
seven counts (making the total now 100 counts) and additional forfeiture allegations 
(Doc. 230).  The Indictment now runs to 92 pages, containing 211 paragraphs of 
allegations and additional forfeiture allegations.  It purports to rely on documentary 
evidence, but the government has not identified the documents cited.  The Indictment 
asserts 50 counts of alleged violations of the Travel Act premised on 50 user-
submitted ads that appeared on Backpage.com (most of which the government alleges 
were posted after VVMH sold Backpage.com to Ferrer), but the overnment does not 
allege that any Defendant ever saw or knew of any of those ads, that any Defendant 
ever had anything to do with any of the ads, or that any Defendant knew anything 
about the persons who posted the ads.  See SI ¶ 201 (counts 2-51).  Similarly, the 
Indictment’s money laundering counts merely (which are predicated on the Travel Act 
counts) allege that funds were transferred from one party to another, with no alleged 
knowledge, participation or involvement of any Defendant in any specific unlawful 
activity.  See SI ¶¶ 205, 207, 209, 210.  
D. Progress of the Prosecution and Litigation to Date. 
Since commencing this prosecution, the government has pursued a number of 
actions that have occupied Defendants, requiring them to devote considerable efforts 
to preserve their rights and ability to defend the case.  This is discussed in more detail 
in Defendants’ Joint Status Report (Doc. 527), but it is relevant to note here that, 
among other things, the government has (1) seized nearly all of Defendants’ assets 
and used procedural machinations to prevent judicial review of the First Amendment 
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and other constitutional violations of the seizures;12 (2) also seized retainer funds held 
by counsel for Defendants (and others);13 (3) sought to disqualify Defendants’ 
longstanding counsel for First Amendment and Internet speech issues (motion denied 
by the Court, Doc. 338); (4) repeatedly sought to invade Defendants’ attorney-client 
privileges by accessing privileged communications and joint representation 
agreements (largely rejected by the Court, see Docs. 345, 441); and (5) refused to 
provide any Brady or Giglio material or all of the Jencks Act materials in its 
possession (including, notably, the statements of its key cooperator, Ferrer), despite 
court deadlines, requiring Defendants to pursue such disclosures (see, e.g., Doc. 273).   
With the recent reassignment of this case following Judge Logan’s recusal, 
Defendants bring the present motion, because, before addressing issues of how this 
case might proceed (e.g., resolving the government’s disclosure obligations, delaying 
tactics, and other issues) it is logical to address, first, whether the case can proceed at 
all.    
III. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Motion to Dismiss Indictment. 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,” and a defendant may be charged 
based only on matters actually presented to the grand jury.  U.S. CONST. amends. V, 
VI.  The Federal Rules implement these guarantees by requiring an indictment to set 
forth “a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting 
the offense charged.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1).  Pursuant to Rule 12, a defective 
12 These issues are pending before the Ninth Circuit in In re:  Any and All Funds Held 
in Republic Bank of Arizona Accounts XXXX1889, XXXX2592, XXXX1938, 
XXXX2912, and XXXX2500, No. 18-56455 (9th Cir.), in which the court has ordered 
expedited argument for July 2019. 
13 These seizures are also subject to pending motions, in In re:  The Seizure Up to and 
Including $10,000 in Bank Funds Held in JP Morgan Chase Account #XXXXX9285, 
etc., No. 18-MJ-02875 (C.D. Cal.).  
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indictment must be dismissed if:  (1) it fails to allege a crime on its face, taking into 
account statutory elements and constitutional requirements; or (2) there is grave doubt 
that the grand jury’s decision to indict was based on errors in the process, such as 
where the government’s instruction on the law was wrong or misleading, or the 
prosecutor’s conduct improperly sought to infringe speech rights.  See United States v. 
Buddenberg, 2010 WL 2735547, at *2-6; Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)-(B).14  “It is 
perfectly proper, and in fact mandated, that the district court dismiss an indictment if 
the indictment fails to allege facts which constitute a prosecutable offense.”  United 
States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120, 1123 (11th Cir. 1983).   
To be sufficient, an indictment must “set forth the elements of the offense 
charged and contain a statement of the facts and circumstances that will inform the 
accused of the specific offense with which he is charged.”  United States v. Cecil, 608 
F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1979); see United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462, 464 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (“The failure of an indictment to detail each element of the charged offense 
generally constitutes a fatal defect.”).  The indictment “must furnish the defendant 
with a sufficient description of the charges against him to enable him to prepare his 
defense, to ensure that the defendant is prosecuted on the basis of facts presented to 
the grand jury, to enable him to plead jeopardy against a later prosecution, and to 
inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the 
charge.”  Cecil, 608 F.2d at 1296.  It is thus essential “that every ingredient of the 
offense charged must be clearly and accurately alleged in the indictment” so that the 
court can decide “whether the facts alleged are sufficient in law to withstand a motion 
14 See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 764 (1962); Wayte v. United States, 470 
U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (“[T]he decision to prosecute may not be ‘deliberately based 
upon an unjustifiable standard’ ... including the exercise of protected statutory and 
constitutional rights.”); United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 857-58 (10th Cir. 
1992) (indictment dismissed where it was a step in a “pattern of prosecutorial conduct 
dating back some five years that suggests a persistent and widespread campaign to 
coerce the appellants into surrendering their First Amendment rights”).   
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to dismiss the indictment or to support a conviction in the event one should be had.”  
Russell, 369 U.S. at 768 n.15.  To be sufficient, an indictment must set forth what 
each defendant is alleged to have done in violation of a specified statute, to whom, 
and where or when it occurred.  Buddenberg, 2010 WL 2735547, at *3.   
In addition to Fifth and Sixth Amendment requirements set forth above, it is 
also necessary under Rule 12(b)(3)(B) to review the sufficiency of an indictment in 
light of First Amendment considerations.  United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 301 
(9th Cir. 2013).  While the court cannot evaluate the evidence upon which an 
indictment is based, it must review whether the alleged statements at issue constitute 
unprotected speech.  It is not enough for an indictment merely to claim speech is 
unprotected; it is “incumbent on the Government to make that context clear in such an 
indictment.”  United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1080 (6th Cir. 2001). Where 
charges have First Amendment implications, as they do here, the government must 
“more specifically identify the precise conduct” alleged to fall outside constitutional 
protection.  Buddenberg, 2010 WL 2735547 at *9; accord United States v. Cassidy, 
814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582-83 (D. Md. 2011).  And, given the government’s theory of 
prosecution, the Court must consider whether the stated charges render the statute at 
issue unconstitutional facially or as applied.  E.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 
S. Ct. 1730, 1737-38 (2017); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (charge 
“must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind”). 
B. First Amendment Requirements Governing Prosecution of 
Publishers. 
The Indictment in this case requires particular First Amendment scrutiny 
because government is seeking to prosecute Defendants for their roles as publishers of 
third-party speech.  The government is not prosecuting the individuals who authored 
and posted ads on Backpage.com for unlawful activities they might have committed, 
but is instead seeking to impose vicarious liability on the parties who owned the 
online forum where the ads were posted.  No reported (or contested) case has ever 
accepted such a theory of vicarious criminal liability, while many courts have rejected 
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it, including numerous cases concerning Backpage.com (as discussed below).   
In the context of a prosecution such as this – seeking to impose criminal 
liability on a publisher for publishing – several fundamental First Amendment 
principles apply and govern the Court’s role in determining whether the Indictment 
impermissibly challenges protected speech rights.  More specifically: 
 Adult-oriented online ads, including escort ads, are presumptively legal and 
constitutionally protected speech.  See McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1282; 
People v. Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305, at *10. 
 The government may not presume that protected speech is unprotected 
“merely because it resembles the latter.  The Constitution requires the 
reverse.”  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).  
Whether made by the government or by third-parties, claims that adult-
oriented ads are “obviously” prostitution ads fall far short of this First 
Amendment standard. 
 The government cannot base criminal liability on a publisher’s exercise of 
“editorial control and judgment,” including decisions about whether to 
allow, block or edit third-party content, as this is protected conduct under 
the First Amendment.  See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241, 258 (1974); e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 
2210029, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017). 
 The government cannot impose vicarious liability based on allegations that 
a publisher had notice that third parties had misused a website for unlawful 
conduct.  See Backpage.com v. Dart, 807 F.3d at 231; Doe v. GTE Corp., 
347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003).  The First Amendment does not permit 
civil or criminal liability based on allegations of generalized knowledge of 
illegal third-party conduct.   
 To hold a party liable for publishing a third-party’s speech, the First 
Amendment requires that the government allege (and ultimately prove) the 
defendant knew the specific speech involved illegality, the defendant 
nonetheless published that speech, and that the defendant intended to 
participate in and further the illegality.  See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 
147 (1959). 
 The government cannot satisfy its obligation to allege specific facts 
sufficient to satisfy First Amendment pleading standards by repeating 
conclusory claims made by politicians, advocacy organizations, and some 
law enforcement officials asserting that Backpage.com was “known” for 
promoting prostitution. 
The Indictment in this case violates each and all of these principles.   
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C. Mens Rea Requirements  
Both statutory and First Amendment considerations require the indictment to 
meet a specific intent standard of mens rea requiring showings that defendants knew 
the content of a specific ad was illegal and intended to further that particular crime.  A 
prosecution under the Travel Act requires the government to allege “that the accused 
formed a specific intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on or facilitate one of the 
prohibited activities.”  United States v. Gibson Specialty Co., 507 F.2d 446, 449 (9th 
Cir. 1974).  The same mens rea standard governs allegations of money laundering.  
See United States v. Brown, 186 F.3d 661, 670 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Trejo, 
610 F.3d 308, 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2010).  In addition, it is a basic proposition of First 
Amendment law that the government cannot criminally punish publishers or 
distributors of speech without sufficient proof of scienter, i.e., that a defendant knew 
the specific speech that is the basis for criminal charges was unlawful and had specific 
intent to violate the law.  Smith v. California, 361 U.S. at 153-54; Mishkin v. New 
York, 383 U.S. 502, 511 (1966); Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 830. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Indictment and the Government’s Theory of Prosecution Are 
Fatally Deficient. 
The government’s Indictment is a prolix pleading that is long on aspersions 
and innuendo but devoid of any bases to charge crimes against Defendants.  In terms 
of actual fact allegations, the Indictment attacks First Amendment-protected conduct 
common among websites – e.g., screening and editing third-party content, reposting 
user-created content – and the only whiff of illegality is the government’s improper 
presumptions (and mischaracterizations) that all adult ads on Backpage.com were for 
prostitution.  The Indictment is also completely bereft of any constitutionally 
sufficient basis to allege mens rea.  It asserts no fact allegations that any Defendant 
ever even saw any of the specific ads the government alleges were for criminal 
activities (see SI ¶ 201), much less that any Defendant intended to participate in and 
further illegal conduct of the third-party posters.  
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1. Impermissibly Presuming that Ads Are Illegal. 
The Indictment assumes from the outset – and throughout – that all 
advertisements in the adult or escort categories on Backpage.com were illegal and 
unprotected by the First Amendment.  This ignores the principle that speech must be 
presumed to be protected unless and until the government proves otherwise.  “The 
government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.  
Protected speech does not become unprotected merely because it resembles the latter.”  
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002); accord Packingham, 137 
S. Ct. at 1738.  The burden of proving that speech is unlawful always falls to the 
government.  See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) 
(“When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving 
the constitutionality of its actions.”); id. at 818 (“When First Amendment compliance 
is the point to be proved, the risk of nonpersuasion … must rest with the Government, 
not with the citizen.”); Bd. of Trs. v. State Univ. of N.J. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 
(1989) (“the State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions”).  Just as the 
government cannot assume books are obscene if they are sold in an adult bookstore, it 
cannot presume escort ads are for prostitution.15
The government simply cannot assume its conclusion that speech is unlawful or 
unprotected, nor can an Indictment based on such an unconstitutional presumption 
survive.  The Indictment does not allege that any specific ads on Backpage.com were 
facially illegal.16  Instead it offers the government’s characterizations (scores of times) 
15 This is true regardless of the form of regulation or proscription of speech the 
government pursues – whether enacting legislation, see, e.g., Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 
at 837; threatening punishment because of published speech, see Backpage.com v. 
Dart, 807 F.3d at 229; or pursuing criminal charges, see, e.g., People v. Ferrer, 2016 
WL 7237305, at *3. 
16 The Indictment alleges that ads on Backpage.com contained “provocative” photos of 
women showing “buttocks” or “breasts” (albeit clothed) or terms such as “sexy,” 
“fun,” “young,” and “exotic,” see, e.g., SI ¶¶ 163, 168, 173, 174, 175, 176.  Perhaps 
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that all ads in adult categories on Backpage.com were for “prostitution” or “obviously 
for prostitution” or “indicative of prostitution.”  See, e.g., SI ¶¶ 1, 9, 34, 68, 74, 78, 86, 
87, 90, 91, 95, 96, 97, 104, 107, 109, 111, 128, 131, 132, 136, 141, 143, 144, 151, 152, 
153, 154, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 167, 170, 177.17
The First Amendment prohibits the government from declaring that online 
classified ads for adult services or escorts are unprotected simply because it thinks they 
“look like” ads for illegal prostitution.  Yet that is the mistaken premise of the 
government’s case.  Every court to address this question – and this includes eight 
courts addressing Backpage.com – has held that the government cannot presume such 
ads are unprotected.  As the Seventh Circuit put it:  Backpage.com was “an avenue of 
expression of ideas and opinions” protected by the First Amendment, including its 
“classified ads for ‘adult’ services.”  Backpage.com v. Dart, 807 F.3d at 230-31, 234.  
As the court recognized in McKenna, 881 F. Supp. at 1282, escort ads have long been 
permitted, and escort services are licensed and regulated in many states.18  Having an 
escorts section in a classified ad service is legal.  Doe v. Backpage.com LLC, 104 F. 
Supp. 3d at 156-57.19  “Providing a forum for online publishing” and “charg[ing] 
money for the placement of advertisements,” as Backpage.com did, are “services 
rendered for legal purposes.”  People v Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305, at *10; accord 
People v. Ferrer, No. 16FE024013, slip op. at 13. 
obviously, speech containing sexual references or innuendo has been protected for 
decades.   
17 Cf. United States v. Perkins, 850 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017) (vacating 
conviction after Franks hearing, holding that search warrant affidavit was deficient and 
misleading where agent described his conclusion that images found on defendant’s 
computer were child pornography but withheld the images, thus “usurp[ing] the 
magistrate’s duty to conduct an independent evaluation of probable cause”).   
18 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 7-51-1102(11) & (12); 7-51-1116; Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 59-27-101 to 108; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1422; Ala. Code § 13A-6-184; Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 12-770(a)(8), (9); Ark. Code Ann. § 14-1-302(9), (10).   
19 See also Dart v. Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (Craiglist’s “adult services” 
section “is not unlawful in itself nor does it necessarily call for unlawful content”). 
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In sum, courts have uniformly held that escort and other adult ads on 
Backpage.com were protected under the First Amendment, providing a forum for such 
ads is likewise protected, and the government cannot presume otherwise. See 
Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d at 234 (rejecting sheriff’s presumption that ads 
on Backpage.com were illegal); McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1281-82 (rejecting 
similar presumption of state AG defending law targeting Backpage, and noting that 
publication of third-party ads – even if they concern illegal transactions – “does not 
fall within [the] ‘well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech’ that fall outside 
of First Amendment protection” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
571-72 (1942)); Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 816, 833-34 (rejecting state’s argument 
that escort ads on Backpage.com were unprotected speech); Hoffman, 2013 WL 
4502097, at *9-11 (same); M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1049-50 (rejecting similar 
presumption in dismissing plaintiff’s civil claims based on 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1595, and 
2255); People v Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305, at *9 (dismissing state’s pimping charges 
against Larkin and Lacey; noting that the only “whiff of illegality” in the AG’s 
complaint improperly “require[ed] the presumption that illegal content was contained 
in the ads,” yet the website’s actions in posting the ads “would not be illegal”).20
Despite that courts have uniformly rejected the government’s presumption that 
all (or the “vast majority”) of escort ads on Backpage.com must have been illegal ads 
for prostitution, the Indictment trots out the same theory again.  This is a direct and 
impermissible attack on First Amendment-protected speech and publishing activities.   
2. Repeating Others’ Accusations. 
The Indictment recycles and repeats government officials’ and others’ 
condemnations of Backpage.com in years past.  See, e.g., SI ¶ 74 (2010 letter from 
20 The presumption the government offers now was also addressed in the earlier 
decision of the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Washington in In re 
Grand Jury Subpoenas, No. GJ12-172RAJ (W.D. Wash.), at 19-20, which is submitted 
with this motion under seal.   
Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB   Document 539   Filed 04/22/19   Page 29 of 55
19 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
state AGs); ¶ 109 (letter from Seattle mayor); ¶ 111 (letter from National Association 
of Attorneys General); ¶ 140 (amicus brief filed by NCMEC); ¶ 131 (ASU 
publication).  Such assertions are improper and, in any event, cannot constitute fact 
allegations necessary to satisfy First Amendment standards. 
For many years, government officials have made publicized accusations about 
online content they dislike, for example, attacking Craigslist21 and then Backpage 
about adult ads,22 and more recently pressuring Facebook and Twitter about violent 
videos, allegations of fake news, liberal bias, and other charges.23  If merely repeating 
officials’ accusatory press releases about online content could provide bases for a 
criminal indictment, speech across the Internet would be at risk.   
Indeed, the same public accusations noted in the Indictment (including, 
specifically, the 2010 letter from state AGs, see SI ¶ 74) have been cited before by 
government authorities seeking to impose criminal penalties on Backpage.  See, e.g., 
Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 815-16.  But courts have rejected such “evidence” and 
struck down state efforts aimed at Backpage.com as being inconsistent with the First 
Amendment, see id. at 831-32, McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1280-83.  Politicians’ 
denunciations cannot substitute for allegations of fact sufficient to satisfy First 
Amendment scrutiny that charges do not target or infringe protected speech.   
21 Attorneys General Want Craigslist ‘Adult Services’ Shut Down, Reuters (Aug. 26, 
2010), https://www.reuters.com/article/urnidgns002570f3005978d80025778b004b29ff/ 
attorneys-general-want-craigslist-adult-services-shut-down-idUS419264813320100826; 
see also Craigslist, Inc. v. McMaster, 2010 WL 11640195 (D.S.C. 2010).
22 Attorney General Leads 21 States In Calling On Backpage To Close Adult Services 
Section (Sept. 21, 2010), https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Press-Releases-Archived/2010-
Press-Releases/Attorney-General-Leads-21-States-In-Calling-On-Backpage-To-Close-
Adult-Services-Section. 
23 See, e.g., Zach Wichter, 2 Days, 10 Hours, 600 Questions: What Happened When 
Mark Zuckerberg Went to Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/technology/mark-zuckerberg-testimony.html; 
Cecilia Kang, et al., Twitter’s Dorsey Avoids Taking Sides in Partisan House Hearing, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/technology/facebook-twitter-congress.html. 
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3. Attacking Traditional, Protected Publisher Functions. 
The Indictment contains numerous allegations attacking Backpage.com’s efforts 
to screen, block or edit content – attempting to cast these practices as nefarious and 
criminal.  However, screening and editing third-party content is common among 
websites; Congress has expressly encouraged such self-policing (by enacting the 
CDA).  More importantly, website’s editorial decisions about what third-party content 
to allow, block or edit are recognized publisher functions protected under the First 
Amendment.  Here again, the Indictment fails because it attacks First Amendment-
protected conduct.   
The Supreme Court long ago made clear that the First Amendment protects 
“editorial control and judgment.”  Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.  This principal applies to 
speech on the Internet.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997) (“[O]ur cases 
provide no basis for qualifying the level of First amendment scrutiny that should be 
applied to this medium.”).  Such protection is particularly important for online 
publishers, which have millions of users and cannot possibly be charged with an 
obligation to screen “each of their millions of postings for possible problems.”  Zeran 
v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).  As has become well 
recognized, editorial activities of online intermediaries are protected by the First 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Washington Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 300 (D. 
Md. 2019) (enjoining Maryland statute that required social media and news websites to 
self-publish information about political ads, holding that the statute infringed editorial 
judgments; “This respect for a publisher’s right to exercise ‘editorial control and 
judgment’ … applies with equal force to outlets that publish content on the Internet”) 
(quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258), appeal filed, No. 19-1132 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2019); 
Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“a ‘search 
engine’s editorial judgment is much like many other familiar editorial judgments,’ 
Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB   Document 539   Filed 04/22/19   Page 31 of 55
21 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
such as the newspaper editor’s judgment of which wire-service stories to run and 
where to place them in the newspaper”).24
A website’s “decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of 
content [are] actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s role.”  Green v. Am. 
Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003).  “[D]eciding whether to publish, 
withdraw, postpone, or alter content” is the “exercise of a publisher’s traditional 
editorial functions.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; accord Jones v. Dirty World Entm't 
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014) (“a publisher’s traditional editorial 
functions” include “deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content”); 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) (“removing content is 
something publishers do”).  In fact, 23 years ago, Congress set out not only to protect 
but to encourage online providers to engage in such editorial practices of monitoring, 
limiting, and/or editing user-submitted content, with the intent that self-policing would 
better “maintain the robust nature of Internet communication, and … keep government 
interference in the medium to a minimum.”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 
(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330).25
24 See also e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2210029, at *4 (M.D. 
Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (“A search engine is akin to a publisher, whose judgments about 
what to publish and what not to publish are absolutely protected by the First 
Amendment”; holding that “Google’s actions in … determining whether certain 
websites are contrary to Google’s guidelines and thereby subject to removal are the 
same as decisions by a newspaper editor regarding which content to publish, which 
article belongs on the front page, and which article is unworthy of publication.  The 
First Amendment protects these decisions, whether they are fair or unfair, or motivated 
by profit or altruism.”); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629-630 (D. 
Del. 2007) (First Amendment protects decisions about placement, ranking, or rejection 
of online advertisements); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., 2003 WL 21464568 
*4 (W.D. Okla. 2003) (“Google’s PageRanks are entitled to ‘full constitutional 
protection.’”).
25 See Bennett v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2692607, at *2 (D.D.C. June 21, 2017) 
(“holding Google liable for establishing standards and guidelines would ultimately 
create a powerful disincentive for service providers to establish any standards or ever 
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The government ignores all of this established law to allege that protected 
editorial practices for reviewing and blocking user-submitted content should instead be 
the basis for criminal liability.  In terms of fact allegations, the Indictment alleges that 
“Backpage periodically used computerized filters and human ‘moderators’ to edit the 
wording of (or block) ads,” but then adds the conclusory assertion that this was done to 
“remov[e] particular terms that were indicative of prostitution.”  SI ¶¶ 11, 68.  This is a 
mischaracterization contrary to the very documents upon which the government 
purports to rely.26 See McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1266-67 (Backpage used 
automated filters to screen for 26,000 terms, phrases, email addresses, URLs and IP 
addresses, and employed 100 personnel to review and block ads violating the website’s 
terms of use); Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (Backpage.com’s monitoring blocked or 
removed one million ads in April 2012).  But, regardless, these and similar allegations 
of the Indictment27 reflect that the government impermissibly disregards First 
decide to remove objectionable content, which the CDA was enacted to prevent”), 
aff’d sub nom., Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
26 For example, the Indictment refers to an April 2008 email from Ferrer as allegedly 
stating that “he was unwilling to delete prostitution ads” and so instructed staff to “edit 
the wording of such ads, by removing particular terms that were indicative of 
prostitution, and then allow the remainder of the ad to be featured on Backpage’s 
website.”  SI ¶ 68.  However, the actual email does not say this, does not refer to 
“prostitution ads” nor that the terms to be blocked were “indicative of prostitution,” 
but rather stated that blocking ads could lead to user complaints and chargebacks.  See 
DOJ-BP-0000192778. 
Additionally, the Indictment’s allegations about Backpage.com editing ads (to eliminate 
words and photos that violated the website’s terms of use) concern only a period of 
months at the end of 2010, see SI ¶¶ 72-87 (allegations all from September 1, 2010 to 
December 2010), which was immediately after Craigslist removed its category for 
“adult services” in response to pressure from government officials, and Backpage.com 
significantly expanded its moderation efforts to deal with an influx of submissions.  
Significantly, none of the ads that are the bases for the Indictment’s Travel Act counts 
were published during this time period.   
27 The Indictment similarly casts aspersions that Backpage.com failed to adopt other 
rules or review practices for user content.  See, e.g., SI ¶¶ 14, 90, 100, 101, 106, 131.  
But, deciding not to implement practices are protected editorial decisions every bit as 
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Amendment principles to base charges on editorial practices that are common among 
websites28 and constitutionally protected. 
In fact, courts have expressly rejected the government’s theory in others’ 
attempts to ascribe criminal liability to Backpage.com.  In M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 
1041, the court dismissed outright the plaintiff’s claims against Backpage.com 
predicated on 18 U.S.C. § 2 (for allegedly aiding and abetting sex trafficking by users 
who posted ads on the site).  Id. at 1054.  Rejecting accusations that Backpage.com 
was designed to promote prostitution and sex trafficking, id. at 1044, the court held 
that Backpage.com could not be liable based on users’ misuse of its services, and 
merely asserting that such misuse occurred could not establish that the website had the 
requisite specific intent, i.e., that it knew of and shared the user’s intent to commit 
specific sexual offenses, id. at 1054.  In Doe v. Backpage.com, the court rejected 
claims based on the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. § 1591, see 
18 U.S.C. § 1595), noting that allegations about Backpage.com’s editorial practices 
(much the same as the Indictment’s allegations here), whether viewed “[s]ingly or in 
much as decisions to implement practices.  See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 
420 (5th Cir. 2008) (allegations seeking to hold MySpace liable for not adopting safety 
measures were merely another way of improperly claiming the website operator was 
liable for its “role as a publisher of third-party-generated content”); accord Jane Doe 
No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2016).   
28 For example, Craigslist’s posting rules for adult ads were essentially the same as 
Backpage.com’s, prohibiting terms that “suggest or imply an exchange of sexual favors 
for money” including use of “any and all code words” (providing examples) or any 
“attempt to avoid detection of forbidden language by using spelling variations” (again 
providing examples), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20100526124651/www.craigslist.org/about/help/Adult_Ser
vices_Posting_Guidelines (Craigslist Adult Service Posting Guidelines, May 26, 2010); 
see also craigslist, Inc. v. McMaster, 2010 WL 11640195, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 6, 2010) 
(quoting rules); Match.com, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20100627072807/www.match.com/registration/membagr.as
px (June 27, 2010 Terms of Use:  “Match.com may review and delete any content, 
messages … photos or profiles …, in each case in whole or in part, that in the sole 
judgment of Match.com violate this Agreement or which might be offensive, illegal, or 
that might violate the rights, harm, or threaten the safety of Members.”). 
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the aggregate” cannot “amount to … affirmative participation in an illegal venture.”  
104 F. Supp. 3d at 157; see also People v. Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305, at *3, *10 
(taking into account First Amendment interests, holding that Backpage.com’s 
provision of “a forum for online publishing” and receiving payments for ads “qualify 
as services rendered for legal purposes,” insufficient to support charges of pimping, 
facilitating prostitution or money laundering).   
4. Attacking Efforts to Promote or Advertise a Website to Users. 
In a similar vein, the Indictment offers accusations about efforts Backpage.com 
made in its early years to promote customer usage through advertising and by offering 
free ads to users.  There is nothing illegal about such practices, and here again the 
government’s allegations are based entirely on its assumptions that all adult ads are for 
prostitution. 
For example, the Indictment attacks a Backpage.com marketing effort in 2007 
whereby representatives contacted individuals who had posted ads elsewhere (e.g., 
Craigslist), asked if they would be interested in posting their ads on Backpage.com, 
and, if the user agreed, the representative would upload the same ad (as written by the 
user) to Backpage.com.  SI ¶ 36; see generally id. ¶¶ 35-44 (referring to this as 
“aggregation”).  Purporting to rely on Backpage.com emails and other documents, the 
Indictment alleges, however, that “Backpage employees would … identify prostitutes
advertising on other websites” and seek to post their ads.  SI ¶ 36 (emphasis added); see 
also id. ¶ 9.  Yet the cited documents say nothing of the sort, instead referring to 
identifying leads from “employment,” “therapeutic massage,” and “adult” ads posted 
elsewhere.  DOJ-BP-0004602206.  Otherwise, the Indictment merely alleges that this 
marketing effort was successful and helped generate “new adult content” to the website.  
See, e.g., SI ¶ 39. 
The Indictment further presumes that adult ads on Backpage were for 
prostitution because the website received page views from individuals who had visited 
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another site – theeroticreview.com – and, for a time,29 Backpage.com ran banner ads 
on that site. SI ¶ 10 (referring to this as a “reciprocal link” arrangement).  The 
Indictment then notes that a May 2009 newspaper article referred to 
theeroticreview.com as a “prostitution website,” SI ¶ 54, and from this premise asserts 
that Backpage.com “employed … business strategies that were specifically intended to 
promote and facilitate prostitution,” SI ¶ 10.30  Here, the government’s accusations 
amount to presumptions piled atop presumptions – in effect charging Backpage.com 
(and therefore Defendants) with complicity not only for everything that persons 
posting ads on the website might have done (albeit unknown) but also based on which 
other websites individuals reading ads on Backpage.com might have visited.   
As noted, online adult content is presumptively protected speech, and the 
government cannot equate it to prostitution or unlawful speech.  As is true throughout 
the Indictment, stripping out the government’s improper presumptions, these 
allegations describe actions that are legal and recognized publisher functions.  
Reposting third-party content from another website is “a traditionally protected 
editorial function.”  People v. Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305, at *7; see also Barrett v. 
Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 63, 146 P.3d 510, 517 (2006).  Banner ads on websites are 
ubiquitous and one of the largest forms of online advertising.31  Successful marketing 
to online customers is legal and common for websites.  In its role of ensuring that the 
29 Again, this was in the early days of Backpage.com, from 2007-2009, according to 
the Indictment, see SI ¶¶ 45-55, years before any of the alleged ads and transactions 
that form the Indictment’s Travel Act and money laundering counts. 
30 The rest of what the Indictment alleges about theeroticreview is that Backpage ran 
banner ads on that site for a few years and believed that they helped increase user visits 
and page views.  See SI ¶¶ 46-53.  Of course, the government no more assume that all 
content on theeroticreview.com was unlawful than it can make such an assumption as 
to Backpage.com.   
31 US Digital Display Ad Spending to Surpass Search Ad Spending in 2016 (Jan. 11, 
2016), https://www.emarketer.com/Article/US-Digital-Display-Ad-Spending-Surpass-
Search-Ad-Spending-2016/1013442 (2016 spending on online display advertising was 
$32.17 billion, with banners and similar ads accounting for the largest percentage). 
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Indictment is not based on challenges to protected speech or practices, the Court 
should reject these allegations as well. 
B. The Indictment Fails to Allege Any Requisite Mens Rea. 
The premise of the Indictment is that Backpage.com “facilitated” prostitution 
by providing an online forum where third-party users could post adult ads, and 
Defendants can be held criminally liable if they knew that some (or many) users used 
the website for prostitution.  The government’s theory – that Defendants may be 
criminally responsible for general awareness that third parties used Backpage.com for 
criminal purposes – has been universally rejected.  Under both First Amendment and 
statutory standards, the government cannot prosecute on this basis – the law requires 
the government allege and prove specific intent.  The Indictment contains no 
allegations of the requisite mens rea, or anything remotely close.   
1. The Government’s Prosecution is Governed by a Specific Intent 
Standard. 
A prosecution under the Travel Act requires the government to allege “that the 
accused formed a specific intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on or facilitate 
one of the prohibited activities.”  United States v. Gibson Specialty Co., 507 F.2d 446, 
449 (9th Cir. 1974).  In Gibson, the government asserted charges under the Travel Act 
against several manufacturers that sold punchboards and pulltabs to businesses in 
Montana, where the mere possession of those items was illegal under the state’s 
gambling laws.  Even assuming the defendants knew their customers would violate 
Montana law by purchasing those items, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the 
charges, holding that such knowledge could not satisfy the specific intent requirement 
of the Travel Act.  Id. at 450.32  Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that, to show specific 
intent, “the prosecutor must show that the manufacturer in some significant manner 
32 As the Ninth Circuit explained, and apropos to the government’s prosecution theory 
here:  “It is as likely as not that a vendor similar to the defendants in this proceeding is 
totally indifferent to the actions of his purchaser.”  507 F.2d at 450 n.8.   
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associated himself with the purchaser’s criminal venture for the purpose of its 
advancement.”  Id. at 449.33  No lesser showing of mens rea can be sufficient under 
the Travel Act, because otherwise “the act would be plagued by the very 
overexpansiveness which Congress sought to rule out ….”  Id.
Similar mens rea standards of intent (rather than generalized awareness) 
govern allegations of money laundering.  See United States v. Brown, 186 F.3d 661, 
670 (5th Cir. 1999) (“This element is not satisfied by mere evidence of promotion, or 
even knowing promotion, but requires evidence of intentional promotion.”); United 
States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Nor may the government rest 
on proof that the defendant engaged in “knowing promotion” of the unlawful 
activity.”  “‘[K]nowing promotion’ is not enough for a conviction under the federal 
money laundering statute.”); see also R. Jones, Becker, K., Whoever Knowingly 
Advertises: Considerations in Prosecuting Sex Trafficking, U.S. Attorneys’ Bulletin 
(Nov. 2017), https://www.justice.gove/usao/page/file/108856/download (DOJ counsel 
for this case explaining that “[t]he specific intent to promote requirement” is “the 
gravamen” of a money laundering charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and is subject to a 
“stringent” mens rea requirement (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
33 With respect to prostitution offenses, the Travel Act requires not only that a 
defendant intended and took action to promote or facilitate a prostitution offense or 
offenses; but that the promotion or facilitation was of a “business enterprise” involved 
in prostitution.  18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(1); see Gibson, 507 F.2d at 449.  A “business 
enterprise” is a continuous course of criminal conduct, not just a single incident.  This 
element of the Travel Act thus requires a showing that a defendant knew of the 
criminal enterprise and intended to promote or facilitate it.  See United States v. 
Kaiser, 660 F.2d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The Travel Act proscribes … interstate 
travel to promote unlawful ‘business enterprises’ [and] “[t]he words ‘business 
enterprise’ refer to a continuous course of criminal conduct rather than sporadic or 
casual involvement in a proscribed activity.” (internal citations omitted).  As discussed 
above, the Indictment does not allege that any Defendant knew anything about any of 
the ads that are the bases of the government’s charges or had any dealings with the 
third parties who posted the ads, much less that any Defendant knew of any “business 
enterprise” of an individual poster (whom they did not know) and intended to further 
that enterprise (through the publication of ads they never saw).   
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More fundamentally, it is a basic proposition of First Amendment law that the 
government cannot criminally punish publishers or distributors of speech without 
sufficient proof of scienter, i.e., that a defendant knew the specific speech that is the 
basis for criminal charges was illegal.  This basic principle dates back 60 years, to 
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. at 147, in which the Supreme Court struck down a Los 
Angeles ordinance making it a crime for booksellers to possess obscene books.  Even 
though the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech, the Court held that a 
bookseller could not be prosecuted without proof it had knowledge of the contents of 
a given book.  Id. at 153-54.  Absent such scienter, First Amendment rights would be 
severely chilled – the bookseller could not fairly be charged with “omniscience” as to 
everything in its store, and the bookseller’s burden “would become the public’s 
burden” because speech would be suppressed for fear of liability.  Id.; see also 
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 511 (1966) (“The Constitution requires proof of 
scienter to avoid the hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally protected 
material ....”); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) 
(interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2252 to require proof that defendant knew that one or more 
specific performers in video were under 18, because a statute “bereft of [such] a 
scienter requirement … would raise serious constitutional doubts”).34
The DOJ itself has admitted that a website operator cannot be liable under 
federal criminal laws absent proof that it knew of, and intentionally participated in, 
illegal conduct of specific individuals using the website.  The DOJ has said this not 
once, but many times. 
In 2010, the DOJ’s National Coordinator for Child Exploitation, Prevention, 
and Interdiction was asked in Congressional hearings:  “[W]hat laws apply to Internet 
34 As courts have also recognized, the First Amendment burden imposed by self-
censorship is magnified on the Internet, because “websites … will bear an impossible 
burden to review all of their millions of postings or, more likely, shut down their adult 
services section entirely.”  Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 830. 
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providers like craigslist that would make them criminally liable for the postings?”  She 
responded:   
I am not aware of any laws that would make them liable [for third-party 
postings], unless there was evidence that craigslist was a participant … 
conspiring with those who were misusing their site, that is, knowingly 
conspiring to violate the laws.…  I am not aware of any Federal statutes 
anyway with respect to neglect being the standard.  In Federal law, the 
standard for prosecution would be knowing or willful….  I am not aware 
of anything that shows us that craigslist might be criminally liable….  
[A]t this point, we have the proper tools.  We have what we need to 
prosecute the guilty, that is, the people who are using the Internet ….  
And I don’t think anyone … here would propose closing the Internet.”   
Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking:  Hearing Before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & 
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 215-16 (2010)), 
attached as Exhibit B.   
More recently, in 2016, when Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 1591 in what was 
called the “SAVE Act,” (which added “advertising” as a predicate act for sex 
trafficking if done “knowingly”), in order to withstand Backpage.com’s constitutional 
challenge to the act, the government insisted that a website publisher could not be 
liable absent specific knowledge of and participation in an incident of sex trafficking: 
Even if an advertisement for illegal sex trafficking appeared on [its] 
website, [Backpage] could not be convicted under [the law] without  
proving that [it] knew that the advertisement at issue related to illegal sex 
trafficking of a minor or of a victim of force, fraud, or coercion.   
DOJ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, at 7-8, Backpage.com, LLC v. Lynch, No. 
1:15-2155(RBW (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2016) (ECF No. 13).  The district court agreed with 
this interpretation and dismissed Backpage.com’s challenge, concluding the website 
faced no credible threat of prosecution given its practices and that the statutory 
amendments increased the mens rea requirement for liability so as to protect websites.  
Backpage.com, LLC v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 3d 96, 108-09 (D.D.C. 2016); see also 161 
Cong. Rec. H596, H598-H600 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2015) (intent of amendments was to 
“raise the bar” by requiring proof that websites had knowledge that given ads were 
unlawful, so as to avoid constitutional problems).   
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In Congress’s most recent attempt to target Backpage.com – the “Fight Online 
Sex Trafficking Act” (or “FOSTA”), which amended federal sex trafficking laws and 
Section 230 – legislators also recognized that the law does not allow criminal liability 
based on allegations of “generalized knowledge.”   
Though under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, a website may be held criminally liable 
for knowingly advertising sex trafficking, this knowledge standard is 
difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  This is so because online 
advertisements rarely, if ever, indicate that sex trafficking is involved.  
The advertisements neither directly nor implicitly state that force, fraud, 
or coercion was used against the victim, nor do they say that the person 
depicted being prostituted is actually under the age of 18.  … Further, 
general knowledge that sex trafficking occurs on a website will not 
suffice as the knowledge element must be proven as to a specific victim.
Report on H.R. 1865, No. 115-572 at 5, https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/hrpt572/ 
CRPT-115hrpt572-pt1.pdf (emphasis added). And writing to the House about that 
legislation, DOJ acknowledged the high burden of proof for advertising, given First 
Amendment implications:   
Section 1591 already sets an appropriately high burden of proof, 
particularly in cases involving advertising.  Under current law, 
prosecutors must prove that the defendant knowingly benefitted from 
participation in a sex trafficking venture, knew that the advertisement 
related to commercial sex, and knew that the advertisement involved a 
minor or the use of force, fraud, or coercion. 
Letter from DOJ Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd to Congressman Robert 
W. Goodlatte (Feb. 27, 2018)), Exhibit C. 
The government has acknowledged in other cases it has the burden to prove not 
just that the Defendants knew that particular ads were for prostitution, but that they 
had the specific intent to facilitate those particular acts of prostitution.  In Woodhull 
Freedom Foundation v. United States, the government argued that for prosecutions 
under the Travel Act, the prosecutor must prove “not simply that the defendant was 
aware of a potential result of the criminal offense, but instead that the defendant 
intended to ‘explicitly further[]’ a specified unlawful act.”  334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 199-
201 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal filed, No. 18-5298 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 2018).  The court 
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agreed with the government and held that the law applies only to “specific unlawful 
acts with respect to a particular individual, not the broad subject-matter of 
prostitution.”  Id.  Most recently, in defending the district court decision in that case, 
DOJ repeated its position that in a prosecution under the Travel Act, the government 
must allege that the defendant acted to intentionally promote or facilitate a “specific, 
unlawful instance of prostitution.”  Brief for the United States in Woodhull Freedom 
Found. v. United States, No. 18-5298 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 15, 2019) (Doc. #1782997) at 
21-22.   
2. The Indictment Fails to Allege Specific Intent. 
The essential premise of the Indictment is that the Defendants had general 
knowledge that Backpage.com was used by third parties to advertise prostitution and 
that they took steps to encourage and promote such uses.  The charges are false, but for 
the purpose of reviewing the indictment under Rule 12(b)(3)(B), the allegations are 
defective as a matter of law because the government fails to allege the necessary mens 
rea as to any specific acts, either for the website or for any of the individual 
Defendants.  
The overwhelming premise of the Indictment is that the Defendants had a 
general awareness that “the vast majority” of advertisements in the adult and escort 
sections of Backpage.com were for prostitution and a general intent to promote such 
ads.  SI ¶¶ 1, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 19, 24, 34, 52, 59, 68, 69, 71, 75, 91, 92, 98, 114.  The 
Indictment lists a series of specific instances involving seventeen individuals it 
describes as “victims,” SI ¶¶ 160-176, but in no case does it assert that any Defendant 
had any awareness of ads involving the alleged victims, or any intent to facilitate 
prostitution of those persons.  Rather than specific knowledge or intent, the Indictment 
claims the requisite mens rea can be imputed to the Defendants because of general 
allegations leveled by law enforcement officials, SI ¶¶ 74, 105, 109, 111, 136, 141, 
144; characterizations in news stories, id. ¶¶ 127, 146; statements by advisory bodies 
and advocacy groups, id. ¶¶ 122, 134, 136, 140; allegations by congressional 
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committees, id. ¶ 151, and others.  Id. ¶¶ 69, 131, 135.  The Indictment even suggests 
that the fact Backpage.com’s former CEO cooperated with law enforcement and 
testified in criminal prosecutions of individual pimps somehow supports an allegation 
of mens rea for all other ads on the website.  SI ¶¶ 71, 76, 91.  None of these 
allegations are relevant to the type of showing required for mens rea that the 
government has acknowledged repeatedly – just not in this case. 
Nor do allegations against the individual Defendants attempt to satisfy the 
specific intent requirement.  Even apart from the government’s distortions about what 
the Defendants purportedly said or did, the Indictment fails even to allege that any 
Defendant was aware of any of the ads identified in the Indictment, SI ¶ 201, that any 
Defendant knew any of those ads was for prostitution, that any Defendant was 
involved in the decision to publish any such ad, or that any Defendant made such a 
decision with the intent to further any illegal acts.   
For Michael Lacey, for example, the Indictment alleges that various groups or 
individuals had told him (or forwarded their claims) that they believed that a high 
proportion of ads on Backpage.com were for prostitution.  SI ¶¶ 97, 131, 146, 147.  
After one such allegation was made in a meeting with representatives from the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”), Lacey is alleged to 
have told them “adult prostitution is none of your business.” 35  Lacey also is alleged to 
have once received a letter from an organization that represents sex workers thanking 
Backpage.com “for continuing to permit sex workers ‘to advertise in the ‘Adult’ 
area.’”  SI ¶ 142.  Finally, Lacey allegedly was on an email chain in which Backpage 
staff members reported deleting an ad for which a complaint had been received 
35 SI ¶ 89.   The Indictment also alleges that Lacey “believe[s] in legalized 
prostitution,” SI ¶ 121, and that he once drafted an editorial that the government 
characterizes as “brag[ging] about the company’s contributions to the prostitution 
industry.”  SI ¶ 11, 107.  According to the Indictment, Lacey wrote that Backpage.com 
was “part of the solution” because it provides “transparency, recordkeeping and 
safeguards.”  SI ¶ 11, 107.   
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(although the removal apparently was not made quickly enough in the government’s 
estimation), SI ¶ 126, and allegedly was sent an email in which the former CEO 
recommended against adopting one of NCMEC’s suggested reforms.  SI ¶ 106.  The 
Indictment also alleges that Lacey once transferred funds to an overseas bank at a time 
when charges in a California case had been dismissed, and no other charges were 
pending.  SI ¶ 16.  That’s it. 
The allegations regarding James Larkin likewise fail to include any suggestion 
that he was aware of any of the ads identified, that he knew any of those ads was for 
prostitution, that he was involved in deciding to publish any such ad, or that he made a 
decision with the intent to further any illegal acts.  As with Lacey, the Indictment 
alleges that various groups of individuals made general claims to Larkin that 
prostitution ads were prevalent on Backpage.com.  SI ¶¶ 86, 89, 97, 100, 135.  The 
Indictment alleges that Larkin was aware of efforts to grow the business of 
Backpage.com through “aggregation,” “reciprocal links” and banner advertising on 
other websites that contained adult content.  SI ¶¶ 41-43, 47, 49, 50, 56-58, 138.  It 
alleges that Larkin was aware of, and helped edit the editorial in which Lacey claimed 
Backpage.com was “part of the solution.”  SI ¶¶ 12, 107, 108.  The Indictment claims 
that Larkin also was a recipient of the “thank you letter” allegedly sent by an 
organization that represents sex workers, SI ¶ 142, and that he, too, was on the email 
chain in which Backpage staff members reported deleting an ad that purportedly 
involved a minor.  SI ¶ 126.  Likewise, the Indictment alleges that the former CEO 
copied Larkin on an email in which he recommended against adopting one of 
NCMEC’s suggested reforms.  SI ¶ 106.  It also alleges Larkin agreed to have a 
contractor assist with enforcing website rules that banned posting nude photos.  SI 
¶ 103.    
The Indictment’s allegations against John Brunst, as CFO, are entirely barren of 
anything that resembles mens rea.  He allegedly was sent documents describing the 
“Backpage strategic plan” and other presentations that discussed plans to grow the 
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business through “aggregation” and “reciprocal links” with other sites that contained 
adult content, SI ¶¶ 42, 49, 138, 155, 157, and allegedly attended meetings in which 
Google Analytics analyses of web traffic were discussed.  SI ¶¶ 57-58.  The Indictment 
also alleges that Brunst received an email saying that Chase Bank was discontinuing 
accepting transactions from Backpage.com due to allegations about the site.  SI 
¶ 135.36  The Indictment contains no other allegations regarding Brunst. 
Finally, nothing in the Indictment alleges mens rea on the part of EVP Scott 
Spear.  Most of the allegations focus on claims that Spear was involved in efforts to 
expand Backpage.com’s business through “aggregation” and “reciprocal links” with 
other sites with adult content.  SI ¶¶ 35, 38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 56, 57, 58, 
65.  The Indictment also alleges that Spear heard or was sent general claims that 
prostitution ads were prevalent on Backpage.com.  SI ¶¶ 97, 100, 135.  It claims that 
Spear received emails describing Backpage.com’s enforcement of terms of service, 
including the banning of images depicting sex acts, SI ¶¶ 70, 73, 81, 103, and that he 
was on email chains in which certain recommended changes in website policies were 
rejected.  SI ¶ 90.  Finally, without reference to any particular ad, the Indictment 
alleges that Spear was aware that certain words are “code” for prostitution.  SI ¶ 149.  
As with all the other Defendants, there are no allegations that Spear was aware of any 
of the ads identified, that he knew any of those ads were for prostitution, that he was 
involved in any decision to publish the such ads, or that he made a decision with the 
intent to further any illegal acts. 
3. Case Law Compels Dismissal of the Indictment. 
The Indictment is a mash-up of broad, generalized allegations coupled with a 
complete absence of specific allegations that go to the essential element of mens rea.  
36 Allegations about banks or credit card issuers deciding not to process transactions on 
Backpage.com, see, e.g., SI ¶¶ 178, 179, 181, 183, presumably for perceived 
reputational reasons, do not suffice as allegations that Brunst specifically intended to 
promote or facilitate publishing ads for prostitution, let alone that he ever had any 
knowledge of or involvement with any of the ads cited in the Indictment. 
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There is not a single allegation of fact against any Defendant that shows awareness of 
a particular illegal ad, much less the necessary intent to facilitate any illegality.  An 
indictment must be dismissed where the government attempts to “rely on the 
defendants’ conduct as a whole.”  Buddenberg, 2010 WL 2735547 at *10.  Especially 
in this context, where the government is seeking to impose criminal liability on a 
publisher for content provided by others, given the First Amendment implications, it 
must “more specifically identify the precise conduct upon which it seeks to hold each 
defendant criminally liable.”  Id. at *9.  Even without regard to First Amendment 
principles, the indictment must be dismissed in any event based on a failure to allege 
specific intent, given the mens rea standard under the Travel Act and money 
laundering statute.  E.g., Woodhull Freedom Found., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 199-201.  See 
supra Sections III.C, IV.B.1. 
The essential allegations of the Indictment are that Backpage.com provided a 
platform for escort and adult-themed ads (which the government equates with 
illegality), that it actively sought to promote that aspect of the business, that the 
Defendants failed to heed warnings or take adequate steps to prevent such postings, 
and that moderation practices implementing Backpage.com’s terms of service 
generally “facilitated” prostitution.  Even if the Indictment contained specific 
allegations of fact to support such claims against each Defendant (which it does not), 
none of this amounts to culpable criminal behavior, or that Defendants had the 
necessary mens rea, as numerous courts have held.   
In Dart v. Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, for example, the sheriff of Cook 
County charged that the “erotic services” section of Craigslist constituted a “public 
nuisance” that violated “federal, state, and local prostitution laws,” including 
specifically, the Travel Act.  Id. at 963.  Sheriff Dart made the very familiar-sounding 
allegations that Craigslist was “the single largest source for prostitution, including 
child exploitation, in the country,” that users posted “obvious” ads for prostitution 
using coded language with “nude or nearly nude pictures,” that Craigslist assisted 
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these postings through its moderation process, and that the overall allegations were 
supported by the opinions of advocacy groups and other law enforcement bodies.  Id. 
at 962-63.  Like the Indictment in this case, “Sheriff Dart’s lengthy complaint relie[d] 
heavily on a few conclusory allegations to support the contention that [the website] 
induces users to post ads for illegal services.”  Id. at 969.  Nevertheless, the court held 
that “[t]he phrase ‘adult,’ even in conjunction with ‘services,’ is not unlawful in itself 
nor does it necessarily call for unlawful content,” and websites that host such content 
“are not culpable for ‘aiding and abetting’ their customers who misuse their services to 
commit unlawful acts.”  Id. at 967-68 (“Plaintiff is simply wrong when he insists that 
these terms are synonyms for illegal sexual services.”).  The court observed that these 
types of allegations may be characterized as “negligent publishing,” id. at 967, a notion 
that could never satisfy the strict criminal pleading standard of specific intent. 37
Other courts have made the same point that some level of “general awareness” 
does not satisfy the mens rea requirement.  See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 
659 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Even entities that know the information’s content do not become 
liable for the sponsor’s deeds.  Does a newspaper that carries an advertisement for 
‘escort services’ or ‘massage parlors’ aid and abet … prostitution, if it turns out that 
some (or many) of the advertisers make money from that activity?  How about 
Verizon, which furnishes pagers and cell phones to drug dealers…?”);  In re Aimster 
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A retailer of slinky dresses is not 
37 See, e.g., M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (Backpage could not be liable based on 
allegations it aided violations of federal criminal statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 1591, 
because publishing third-party ads cannot establish the specific intent required); 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1277-79 (“[W]here an online service provider publishes 
advertisements that employ coded language, a reasonable person could believe that 
facts exist that do not in fact exist: an advertisement for escort services may be just 
that.…  However, if the offer is implicit, how can a third party ascertain that which is 
being offered before the transaction is consummated?”); cf. McMaster, 2010 WL 
11640195, at *10 (dismissing as moot constitutional challenge to threatened 
prosecution of Craigslist after Attorney General abandoned “generalized” theory of 
prosecution).   
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guilty of aiding and abetting prostitution even if he knows that some of his customers 
are prostitutes….”).  Of particular relevance here, the Seventh Circuit observed that 
“Backpage is an intermediary between the advertisers of adult services and visitors to 
Backpage’s website,” and intermediaries “do not become liable for the sponsor’s [i.e., 
advertiser’s] deeds” “[e]ven [if they] know the information’s content.”  Backpage.com 
v. Dart, 807 F.3d at 234.   
The Indictment contains no allegations as to Backpage.com as a website, and 
certainly not for any of the individual Defendants, that could satisfy a specific intent 
standard.  This “complete failure to recite an essential element of the charged offense 
is not a minor or technical flaw subject to harmless error analysis, but a fatal flaw 
requiring dismissal of the indictment.”  United States v. Du Bo, 186 F.3d 1177, 1179 
(9th Cir. 1999) (an indictment failing to allege the requisite mens rea “on its face is 
deficient” because “implied, necessary elements, not present in the statutory language, 
must be included in an indictment”); accord United States v. Pernillo-Fuentes, 252 
F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001) (indictment dismissed for failure to allege specific 
intent); United States v. Carbajal, 42 F. App’x 954, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).  
Without an express statement of the required level of mens rea, an indictment fails to 
ensure that the defendant is being prosecuted only “on the basis of the facts presented 
to the grand jury.”  Du Bo, 186 F.3d at 1179 (quoting United States v. Rosi, 27 F.3d 
409, 414 (9th Cir. 1994)).  In the absence of specific allegations, it is impossible to 
know “if the grand jury would have been willing to ascribe criminal intent” to the 
Defendants.  Id. at 1179-80.  See Buddenberg, 2010 WL 2735547, at *9.  Such a 
defective indictment requires dismissal because it fails to “properly allege an offense 
against the United States.”  United States v. Morrison, 536 F.2d 286, 289 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
C. The Travel Act is Unconstitutional as Applied in the Indictment 
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1. Indictment Bases Travel Act Allegations as Generalized Crimes 
As set forth in detail above, the Indictment alleges that the Defendants had 
general knowledge that Backpage.com was used by third parties to advertise 
prostitution and that they took steps to encourage and promote such uses.  The 
Indictment makes no allegations that any Defendant was aware of any of the ads 
identified, that he knew in advance that any of those ads was for prostitution, or that he 
was involved in decisions to publish any of the ads and did so with the intent to further 
illegal acts.  If the Travel Act could be interpreted and applied so expansively, there 
would be no clear restrictions on its scope and no way to understand its terms.  The 
Travel Act would thus be plainly unconstitutional, as the government seeks to apply it 
in this case.   
The theory of prosecution is that the Defendants used facilities in interstate 
commerce (a website) to promote or facilitate prostitution as prohibited by state law.  
If the Travel Act can be applied to such generalized actions, there are few limits to its 
reach.  The statutory language is expansive, potentially prohibiting any action in 
interstate commerce that would “promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the 
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity” as 
identified by the law.  18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).  The terms “promote” or “facilitate the 
promotion of” have been interpreted quite broadly to mean doing “any act that would 
cause the unlawful activity to be accomplished or to assist in the unlawful activity in 
any way.”  United States v. Bennett, 95 F.3d 1158, at *5 (9th Cir. 1996).  See also 
United States v. Miller, 379 F.2d 483, 485-86 (7th Cir. 1967) (the term “facilitate” in 
the Travel Act interpreted to mean “to make easy or less difficult”).  As the court 
observed in Dart v. Craigslist, “‘[f]acilitating’ and ‘assisting’ encompass a broad[] 
range of conduct, so broad in fact that they include the services provided by 
intermediaries like phone companies, ISPs, and computer manufacturers.”  665 F. 
Supp. 2d at 967.  However, that court rejected such an expansive reading and 
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concluded that such intermediaries “are not culpable for ‘aiding and abetting’ their 
customers who misuse their services to commit unlawful acts.”  Id.  
The Ninth Circuit likewise has rejected such a broad reading of the Travel Act, 
explaining that “intent to facilitate a criminal venture is expressly made part of the 
offense,” and concluding “we cannot extend the statute by holding that proof of a 
lesser mens rea is sufficient to establish the crime.”  Gibson Specialty Co., 507 F.2d at 
449.  The scope of the Travel Act is thus cabined by the requirement that the 
prosecutor show that the defendant had specific knowledge of, and associated himself 
with a criminal venture for the purpose of its advancement.  If not so limited, the court 
found “the act would be plagued by the very overexpansiveness which Congress 
sought to rule out by inclusion of an express mens rea requirement.”  Id.   
2. Government’s Broad Reading of the Travel Act Conflicts With 
the First Amendment. 
Major First Amendment problems arise if the Travel Act can be applied to the 
operation of a website as set forth in the Indictment.  As noted above, the failure to 
incorporate and apply a specific intent requirement is a First Amendment problem in 
its own right.38  In addition, if the law is applied without this important limiting 
principle, the statutory terms become boundless, and the law itself is invalid as being 
both vague and overly broad.  As applied in this case, the Travel Act would allow the 
prosecution of any website operator whose actions could be said to “make easier” or to 
“assist in the unlawful activity in any way.”  That cannot be the law. 
As applied in this Indictment, the Travel Act is unconstitutionally overbroad.  
The law does not define what it means to “promote” or “facilitate the promotion” of 
prostitution, and without some enforceable limits it could be applied to a broad range 
38 See supra Section IV.B.1.  Laws used to target expressive activity require a 
heightened mens rea, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. at 151-53; X-Citement Video, 513 
U.S. at 78 (“It is [] incumbent upon us to read the statute to eliminate [constitutional] 
doubts”), and in particular, knowing conduct, i.e., that any “wrongdoing must be 
conscious to be criminal.”  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) . 
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of communicative activities – as the government is seeking to do here.  See Dart v. 
Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (e.g., “they include the services provided by 
intermediaries like phone companies, ISPs, and computer manufacturers”).  Such 
unbounded application runs afoul of the principle that a law is “may be invalidated as 
overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in 
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
460, 473 (2010) (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican 
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)).  First Amendment freedoms need “breathing 
space” to survive, and this means the “government may regulate in the area only with 
narrow specificity.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).  In reading the 
Travel Act to impose vicarious liability on a website for hosting online content without 
a specific intent requirement, the government has made the law overbroad as applied. 
The government’s interpretation of the Travel Act is also unconstitutionally 
vague as applied.  In this Indictment, the government is seeking to impose massive 
criminal liability on the Defendants by applying the Travel Act’s undefined terms 
“promote” or “facilitate the promotion” of prostitution.39  This application of the 
Travel Act to expressive activities raises particular First Amendment concerns.  As the 
Supreme Court has explained, “[w]here a statute’s literal scope … is capable of 
reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [vagueness] doctrine 
demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.”  Smith v. Goguen, 415 
U.S. 566, 573 (1974).  When applied to speech, vague laws offend due process 
because they fail to give people of ordinary intelligence fair warning of what conduct 
is prohibited, allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and delegate basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
39 E.g., Amusement Devices Ass’n v. Ohio, 443 F. Supp. 1040, 1043, 1051 (S.D. Ohio 
1977) (invalidating state law prohibiting provision of legal services to criminal 
syndicate with a purpose of “establishing or maintaining” the syndicate or “facilitating 
any of its activities” because the language “fails to specify with reasonable clarity 
which kind or kinds of conduct it prohibits.”).   
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subjective basis.  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).  Where penal 
statutes are involved as they are here, “[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone 
in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.”  NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. at 433.  Of particular importance to this case, the “unique nature of the [Internet] 
medium cannot be overemphasized in discussing and determining the vagueness 
issue.”  ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 865 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997). 
The Department of Justice has avoided overbreadth and vagueness problems in 
other cases by interpreting the challenged statutes narrowly and by insisting that strict 
mens rea requirements limit the respective statutes’ applications.  As noted above, in 
First Amendment challenges to the SAVE Act and FOSTA, the government took the 
position that those laws were consistent with the First Amendment because of these 
specific limits.40  In both cases, the courts agreed that these narrow readings of the law 
and strict mens rea requirements were essential to the constitutional analysis.  See
Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 109; Woodhull Freedom Found., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 199-201 
(under the Travel Act, the prosecutor must prove that the “defendant intended to 
‘explicitly further[]’ a specified unlawful act” ).  In this case, however, by abandoning 
any such requirement, the government is applying the Travel Act in a way that is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 
3. The Indictment Must be Dismissed Because it is Predicated on 
an Unconstitutional Application of the Travel Act  
An indictment based on an unconstitutional law, either on its face or as applied, 
must be dismissed.  Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737-38; United States v. Sineneng-
Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 479-85 (9th Cir. 2018).  To be legally sufficient, an indictment 
“must assert facts which in law constitute an offense; and which, if proved, would 
40 See DOJ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 7-8, Backpage.com, LLC v. 
Lynch, No. 1:15-2155(RBW), (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2016) (ECF No. 13); Brief for the 
United States at 21-22, Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, No. 18-5298 (D.C. 
Cir. Apr. 15, 2019) (Doc. #1782997).   
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establish prima facie the defendant’s commission of that crime.”  Landham, 251 F.3d 
at 1079 (citations omitted).  This requires the government to specify “the precise 
conduct upon which it seeks to hold each defendant criminally liable” so that the court 
can determine “whether the specific conduct charged is protected by the First 
Amendment.”  Buddenberg, 2010 WL 2735547, at *9.  A charge that is brought under 
an overly broad application of a law regulating speech cannot satisfy this standard. 
The court applied this principle to dismiss an indictment in United States v. 
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011).  The government had charged the 
defendant with violating a federal law against “cyber stalking,” 18 U.S.C. § 2261A 
(2)(A), through a series of postings on Twitter and on a blog.  The law had been 
amended so that it did not require a showing of intent to kill or injure the subject of the 
online postings, but instead included the intent to “harass or place under surveillance 
with intent to … harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial emotional distress.”  
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 581.  So broadened, the court found that “the 
Government’s Indictment is not limited to categories of speech that fall outside of First 
Amendment protection” and held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied.  Id. 
at 583, 587.  Because it resolved the constitutional question as applied, the court found 
it unnecessary to rule on the law’s facial validity.  Id. at 587. 
This Court should reach the same conclusion about the government’s misuse of 
the Travel Act and money laundering statute to prosecute publishers.  The issue here 
does not go to the statute’s facial validity because the Travel Act, on its face, does not 
criminalize speech.  But the government has indicted the Defendants using the Travel 
Act by targeting their actions as publishers, and doing so without alleging specific 
intent.  The use of the statute in this case violates both the mens rea standard that must 
be applied in First Amendment cases, and it removes the boundaries that otherwise 
prevent the Travel Act from being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  
Accordingly, the Court should hold that the Travel Act is unconstitutional as applied 
and dismiss the Indictment. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants respectfully request that the Court 
dismiss the Indictment.  
DATED this 22nd day of April, 2019. 
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 
s/ James C. Grant
s/ Robert L. Corn-Revere 
Attorneys for Michael Lacey and James Larkin 
LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP 
s/ Paul J. Cambria, Jr. 
Attorneys for Michael Lacey 
BIENERT KATZMAN, PLC 
s/ Thomas H. Bienert, Jr. 
Attorneys for James Larkin 
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